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ABSTRACT 
The study uses three elements of value chain analysis (VCA) – network structure, added value, and governance – to 
explore upgrading possibilities of value chains of producer organisations (PO)s in Indonesia in order to link 
smallholders to the modern retail market. Qualitative data are obtained through semi-structured interviews with 
PO members and other value chain actors. POs upgrade their value chains through linking smallholders with the 
modern retail market. Upgrading network structures is achieved by building collaboration between PO members 
and buyers. Upgrading added value is obtained by increasing the capability of farmers to meet quality 
requirements. Upgrading of governance structures in the chains is reached through contracts as vertical governance 
mechanisms and enhanced member services as horizontal arrangements.  
Keywords Modern retail; Indonesia; producer organisation; value chain; upgrading.   
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1 Introduction  
Upgrading value chains is important for firms in developing countries as a strategy to respond to the 
challenges of globalisation and increased competition (Ponte & Ewert, 2009). Upgrading can enable firms 
and industries to move towards making better products and advance efficiently into more skilled 
activities with greater rewards in high-value markets (Giuliani et al., 2005; Kilelu et al., 2017). In value 
chain analysis, upgrading concepts have been widely applied to identify the possibilities for producers to 
‘move up the value chain,’ either by shifting to more rewarding functional positions or by offering 
products with more added-value (Bolwig et al., 2013; Gereffi, 1999). In many cases, upgrading value 
chains is achieved through multi-business efforts, such as combined upgrading of products and processes 
or collaborative upgrading under contractual arrangements (Humphrey & Schmitz, 2000; Trienekens, 
2011).  
Many studies describe upgrading value chains at the firm or industry level (Giuliani et al., 2005; Lee & 
Gereffi, 2015; Tanrattanaphong et al., 2020; Tessmann, 2018). Other studies on upgrading agri-food value 
chains focus on export markets (Maertens & Swinnen, 2012; Ponte & Ewert, 2009; Roy & Thorat, 2008; 
Trienekens et al., 2017). In addition, some studies examine upgrading of domestic agri -food value chains 
at individual producer level through contract farming (Bellemare, 2012; Maertens & Velde, 2017; Ragasa 
et al., 2018). Only rarely has a study looked at upgrading the value chain at the level of the producer 
organisation (PO), that sells members’ products to domestic modern retailers.  
Similar to export markets, the retail markets in developing countries have transformed to become more 
integrated in vertical coordination and with higher concerns for food quality and safety (Reardon, 2011; 
Reardon et al., 2012). The emergence of modern retail has opened the opportunity for smallholders to 
participate in high-value food chains. However, many farmers face constraints when trying to sell in high-
value markets due to a lack of organisation, finance, and knowledge about certification and quality 
control (Royer et al., 2016). An institutional innovation aiming to solve such constraints  and facilitate 
linking with modern retailers is the producer organisation (Markelova et al., 2009; Royer et al., 2016). 
Although POs have been around in developed and developing countries for a long time, the inno vation 
lies in the more business orientation of modern and new POs (where the old ones were more focussed on 
lobbying and/or distributing state support). Prior studies have found that (modern) POs help smallholders 
connect with high-value markets in developing countries (Fischer & Qaim, 2012; Kaganzi et al., 2009; 
Moustier et al., 2010; Trebbin, 2014). To the best of our knowledge, no studies have been conducted on 
the role of POs in Indonesia in the context of modern retail markets. 
In Indonesia, most smallholder vegetable farmers engage with a Farmer Group (FG), a type of PO initiated 
by the government in 1979 to distribute financial support and technical assistance (Hermanto & Swastika, 
2011; Ibnu et al., 2018). Several POs have evolved from social-community organisations into economic 
organisations whose aim is to integrate their members into high-value food chains. There is, however, 
scant information on how POs engage in upgrading value chains. By using a multiple case study approach, 
our study explores how POs in Indonesia have upgraded their value chains by supporting the link between 
smallholder farmers and modern retail markets. This study contributes to the existing literature on value 
chain development and the role of POs in linking farmers to modern retail markets. The findings may also 
serve as lessons for POs and policy makers to upgrade the capabilities of POs from a value chain 
perspective.  
This paper is organised into seven sections. In Section 2, the theoretical framework is presented. Section 
3 describes the background of modern Indonesian retail, the transformation of POs and vegetable value 
chains. Section 4 presents the methodology used, while Section 5 outlines the empirical re sults, and 
Section 6 discusses the role of the POs in value chain upgrading. Section 7 concludes and discusses 
managerial and policy implications. 
2 Theoretical framework  
Smallholder farmers face constraints when selling farm products in modern retail markets, such as poor 
access to finance, extension services, market information and quality control, and the lack of organisation 
(Royer et al. (2016). Producer organisations have been claimed to be capable of solving these constraints 
by successfully linking farmers to modern retail (Markelova et al., 2009; Trebbin, 2014). 
Value chain analysis (VCA) can be used to describe and explain the role of different actors in a (food) 
value chain. “Value chain” refers to the progression of activities and actors through each phase of 
production, handling, and distribution when delivering a product to the end consumer (Kaplinsky, 2000). 
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These activities include the flow of products, exchange of information, financing of investments, 
distribution of value-added, coordination among actors, and governing the chain (Kaplinsky & Morris, 
2001; Trienekens, 2011). VCA is an analytical approach used to understand the nature of ties between the 
actors in the value chain (De Boer et al., 2019; Ellis et al., 2019).  
VCA can be conducted at different levels: global, macro, meso or micro (Gereffi & Kaplinsky, 2001). This 
study was carried out at the meso level focusing on smallholders’ activities in the domestic modern retail 
market in Indonesia. Trienekens (2011) proposed a framework of VCA in developing countries. He used 
three key elements of VCA in developing countries: network structure, added value and governance. This 
paper uses these three elements of VCA to explore the role of POs in mitigating smallholders’ constraints 
and in linking them to modern retail markets. 
The first element — network structure — includes both vertical and horizontal dimensions. Lazzarini et al. 
(2001) developed the concept of a ‘netchain’ to present the interrelationship between horizontal and 
vertical dimensions in the value chain. The horizontal dimension reflects the collaboration between 
actors at the same level of the chain (e.g., collaboration among the farmers in a PO), while the vertical 
dimension reflects the collaboration between actors at different levels of the chain, such as between 
farmers and traders (Barratt, 2004; Lazzarini et al., 2001). According to Omta et al. (2001), networks are 
looked upon as the total of actors within industries and/or between industries which can work together 
to add value to products. According to Ellis (2010) and Lenney and Easton (2009), joint activities in 
networks include exchange, planning, and organising. The network structure in this study includes the 
vertical and horizontal relationships between PO members and other value chain actors, that jointly 
produce added value. 
The second element is the added value created at different levels and by different actors along the chain 
(Trienekens, 2011). Added value refers to adding economic value to a product by adding characteristics 
preferred by customers (Coltrain et al., 2000). Added value can be achieved, for example, by upgrading 
packaging, processing, and distribution functions (Trienekens, 2011). For the operationalisation of 
upgrading in this study, we focused on value-added activities conducted by the PO to comply with buyers' 
quality specifications and logistic requirements. The main PO activities included the provision of technical 
assistance regarding organic production, the post-harvest handling, and the distribution of vegetables to 
buyers. 
The third element of VCA is the governance of the value chain, that is, the organisational arrangements 
among value chain actors. Governance consists of a collection of rules between actors for carrying out 
their bilateral transactions. In this study, the governance of value chains was identified not only in the 
governance of vertical arrangements between PO and buyers (Wever et al., 2012) but also in horizontal 
arrangements among the members of the PO. These horizontal arrangements relate to the internal 
governance of the PO, such as to how information exchange is organised, how decision are being made, 
and how leaders are selected and elected (Bijman et al., 2007; Bijman et al., 2014). 
Upgrading all three elements of VCA may help smallholder farmers link with modern retail markets. 
Upgrading is defined as the actions a firm takes to improve its abilities to make better products or to 
produce them more efficiently (Gereffi, 1999; Giuliani et al., 2005; Kaplinsky, 2000). Upgrading in 
agrifood value chains may involve modifying production processes to improve productivity  or introducing 
production methods that adhere to quality standards and food safety measures (Bolwig et al., 2013; 
McCullough et al., 2008). In most cases, upgrading of value chains is achieved by using multi-business 
approaches, such as a combination of upgrading of products and processes, often in collaborative 
arrangements (Trienekens, 2011). This study used upgrading options for three elements in VCA, as 
mentioned above—network structure, value-added, and governance. This upgrading, then, will illustrate 
the role of POs in linking smallholder farmers to modern retail markets 
Upgrading network structures in this research refers to improving the networks of POs with buyers on the 
one hand and the members of the PO on the other hand. Network structures depend on market channels  
(Wilkinson, 2001). By improving the network, the PO can help farmers to access (new) market channels, 
for instance shifting from traditional retail markets to higher-value markets. Upgrading added value 
relates to upgrading product quality, packaging, and distribution (Trienekens, 2011). The PO can help 
smallholders increase the value of their vegetables by making sure they meet the qual ity specifications of 
modern retailers. Upgrading governance refers to improving the vertical relationships with the buyers 
and the horizontal relationships among the farmers, so as to reduce transaction costs and strengthen the 
bargaining position of the farmers. According to North (1990), transaction costs consist of information, 
contract, and monitoring costs. Information cost refers to efforts to obtain knowledge about suppliers, 
buyers, and quality of the product. Contract cost relates to the cost of negotiating prices and designing 
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contracts. Monitoring cost refers to determining whether actors are c omplying with their agreements and 
preventing opportunistic behaviour. To reduce transaction costs, actors to a transaction choose a certain 
governance structure depending on the levels of asset specificity, uncertainty, and measurement 
difficulties (Ghosh & John, 1999; Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). Those governance structures range from 
spot market, via contracts to vertical integration (Ménard, 2005; Williamson, 1999). Meanwhile, 
upgrading governance in horizontal relationships is related to improving the internal governance of the 
PO in organising meetings and joint decision-making among the members (Bijman et al., 2014) and 
providing member services (Bijman et al., 2007). Figure 1 illustrates the conceptual framework of this 
study: value chain analysis helps to explore options for value chain upgrading, which leads to mitigating 
smallholder constraints in selling in modern retail markets. Table 1 shows the operationalisation of VCA 





Figure 1. Conceptual framework. 
Table 1. 
Operationalisation of the value chain analysis. 
Value chain 
element 
Dimension Indicators Literature 
Network structure Actors involved in 
increasing added value  
All vertical and horizontal actors 
involved, from producers to end 
market/consumers, in increasing 
added value.  
(Lazzarini et al., 
2001; Omta et al., 
2001) 
Added value Production process  Organic cultivation. (Kaplinsky, 2000; 
Trienekens, 2011) Post-harvest handling  
 
Sorting, cleaning, packaging, 
labelling of brand and organic 
logos. 
Distribution  Delivery or transportation to the 
buyers.  
Governance  Vertical arrangements  Contract arrangements between 
PO and buyers: type of agreement, 
price, quantity, quality, place of 
delivery, and payment mechanism 
(Wever, 2012)  
Horizontal arrangements  Internal governance of PO in 
organising meetings, decision 
making, and providing services. 
(Bijman et al., 
2014; Bijman et al., 
2007) 
3 Background  
3.1 Modern Indonesian retail market  
Modern retail in Indonesia expanded rapidly after 1998 when the government allowed direct foreign 
investment (FDI) in the operation of food retail (Neven & Suleiman, 2007; Suryadarma et al., 2010). In 
2014, the total number of retailers was 24,449, comprising 269 hypermarkets, 1,362 supermarkets, and 
22,818 convenience stores. The market share of modern retail increased constantly each year, from 5% in 
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83% in 2014 (USDA, 2015). Factors driving the emergence of modern retail in Indonesia are income 
growth, liberalisation of FDI in the retail sector, urbanisation, and consumer awareness of food quality 
and safety (Minot et al., 2015; Reardon et al., 2016).  
In the beginning, the modern retail market focussed on staple and processed foods, for which supply 
chains are easy to organise. As the market developed, fresh fruits and vegetables were added to the 
assortment. The retail share of fresh fruits and vegetables (FFV) in Indonesia increased from 15% in 1998 
to 21% in 2014. When purchasing FFV, Indonesian consumers still  rely heavily on the traditional market 
(Minot et al., 2015). However, the share of FFV in retail sales is expected to continue to increase along 
with the rapid growth of consumer demand for food quality, safety, availability, ease, brand, and 
traceability (Natawidjaja et al., 2007; Slamet et al., 2017). In fact, increasing consumer awareness about 
food quality and safety has encouraged retailers to allocate more space to organic products. To supply 
organic vegetables, organic certification from a third party is needed as well as placing an org anic logo on 
the packaging. According to the Alliance of Organic Indonesia (AOI), domestic consumption of organic 
food is dominated by fruits and vegetables (21%), rice (20%), and honey (10%). The total area of land  of 
certified organic crops increased from 62 thousand ha in 2012 to almost 80 thousand ha in 2015 (David & 
Ardiansyah, 2017) .  
3.2 Producer organisations in Indonesia 
One type of PO is the Farmer Group (FG). According to the Indonesian Agriculture Ministry Regulation  
# 82/2013, a FG is defined as a group of farmers formed on the basis of mutual interest, common 
environmental conditions (social, economic, and resources) and solidarity to improve and develop the 
members’ businesses. Commonly, the FGs are formed around the crop(s) cultivated by their member 
farmers. A FG largely contains farmers from the area in and around a specific village. An average FG in 
Indonesia consists of 30 members. These groups organise collaboration among farmers, facilitate 
knowledge sharing and learning processes, and help distribute farming inputs and credit from the 
government (Hermanto & Swastika, 2011; Ibnu et al., 2018). Usually, the members of the FG pay a 
membership fee for covering operational cost and for investments in equipment for  post-harvest 
handling.  
The management board of the groups commonly consist of a group leader, secretary, and treasurer. The 
board consists of members of the FG who are selected in meetings of all the FG members. The leader of 
the FG is the coordinator and energiser of the group – taking actions, making decisions and motivating 
the group to carry out activities that have been determined during the group meetings (Raya, 2014). The 
FG management board governs the PO to ensure that it runs well according to the guidelines outlined in 
the group meetings. FGs are independent of the government in taking any decision.  
The formation of FGs was initiated by the central government in 1979 to facilitate the distribution of 
governmental aid and input subsidies to individual farmers (Hermanto & Swastika, 2011; Ibnu et al., 
2018). Many programs have since been established to strengthen the bargaining position of FGs, to 
improve production, and to provide credit. In many cases government efforts were unsuccessful in 
sustaining of the FGs and many groups collapsed after the project or program was finished (Hermanto & 
Swastika, 2011; Nuryanti & Swastika, 2011). However, those that were based on farmers’ initiative to 
help, serve, and improve their members’ farms remained in existence.  
According to the Indonesian Agriculture Ministry Regulation # 273/2007, FGs should be developed based 
on six principles: openness, freedom, participation, self -reliance, equality, and partnership. FGs also have 
three main functions: (1) helping farmers to improve their knowledge and skills; (2) building cooperation 
among farmers as well as between FGs and with other parties such as buyers, governments and NGOs; 
and (3) helping farmers develop their farms. 
According to data from the Agricultural Extension Center, published in the Indonesian Agriculture 
Ministry’s database1, the number of FGs reached 643,710 in 2020. These FGs have been registered in 
each regional agricultural ministry and they are guided by agricultural extension services to improve 
farmer knowledge. FGs operate with diverse internal governance mechanisms and provide services to 
their members such as inputs for production, technical assistance and training,  post-harvest handling, 
storage, and marketing2.  
                                                 
1 https://app2.pertanian.go.id/simluh2014/index.php 
2 In the rest of the paper we will use the term Producer Organisation (PO) instead of Farmer Group (FG). 
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3.3 Indonesian vegetable value chains in modern retail markets 
The vegetable value chains that supply the modern retail involve several actors at different levels (Figure 
2). Based on the survey and interviews with key informants, we found four vegetable value chains to 
modern retail markets: smallholder farmers can link with retail markets via a PO (chains 1 and 2), a 
specialised wholesaler (chain 3), and a local collector (chain 4). Various vertical coordination mechanisms 
exist in the relationship between farmers and buyers. There are four general types of vegetable value 
chain arrangements. The first is a contract negotiated directly between a PO and a retailer (chain 1). The 
second is a tripartite contract between PO, specialised wholesaler and retailer. The specialised wholesaler 
serves as a service provider for the transactions between PO and retail. The third arrangement is a 
contract between the farmer and a specialised wholesaler. Unlike the contract  of POs, contract 
arrangements of farmers individually with buyers (in this case, specialised wholesalers) are driven by 
buyers (Gramzow et al., 2018). Finally, the fourth arrangement is a spot market arrangement. 
Transactions in the spot market are characterized by low vertical coordination. In spot market 
arrangements, farmers and local collectors engage in transactions mostly at the farm -gate, without any 
quality standards and with variable quantities. The local collectors act as middlemen, subsequently se lling 
and delivering these vegetables to traditional wholesalers.  
The modern retailers in Indonesia mostly use written contracts with specialised wholesalers to procure 
vegetables. The specialised wholesalers, in turn, have their own contracts with various  actors, such as 
POs, farmers, and traditional wholesalers as their strategies to procure the vegetables. The specialised 
wholesalers are commonly small and medium sized enterprises (SMEs), a family business, with few 
employees, and usually owning a truck to transport the fresh produce. They act as collection centers, 
where vegetables are sorted and packaged. They are also gateways through which farmers can enter 
modern retail markets.  
 
 
Figure 2. Vegetable supply chains to modern retailers in Central Java, Indonesia (own survey, 2017)  
4 Research methods  
The study was conducted on the slopes of Mount Merbabu which is administratively divided into three 
regencies: Magelang (subdistricts: Pakis and Ngablak), Boyolali (subdistrict: Cepogo), and Semarang 
(subdistrict: Getasan). These regencies are the centre of vegetables production in Central Java, Indonesia. 
The area of the districts is approximately 18,524 ha. Vegetables produced in this area are supplied to 
modern retailers in the cities of Semarang, Yogyakarta, and Surakarta. 
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To select the POs for our study, we used snowball sampling based on information from three modern 
retailers. We chose three modern retailers3 out of eight which have operated in Central Java and 
Yogyakarta provinces, based on convenient sampling. These three retailers were willing to share 
information and to be interviewed.  
In addition, the three retailers have a high-market share compared to other modern retailers in Indonesia 
(Slamet et al., 2017), and they are spread across the cities in the research area (Semarang, Yogyakarta, 
and Surakarta).  
By tracing the suppliers of the retailers, we found that five POs were involved in modern retail chains. 
Out of these five, we purposively selected three POs because they had different relationships and 
arrangements with their members and buyers. PO1 — Tranggulasi — is located in the village of Batur, a 
sub-district of Getasan, in the regency of Semarang. PO2 — Redo Tani — is located in the village of 
Kragilan, a sub-district of Pakis, in the regency of Magelang. PO3 — Kredo Tani — is located in the village 
of Tarubatang, a sub-district of Selo, in the regency of Boyolali. The selected three POs supplied 
vegetables to two modern retailers via direct contract (chain 1) and specialised wholesalers (chain 2). 
Figure 3 shows the research location of the POs and the modern retailers.  
The unit of analysis in this paper is the PO. This paper uses data collected through semi -structured 
interviews with the actors involved in the chains of the three sampled POs: seven smallholder farm ers 
(members of the PO), four specialised wholesalers, and two modern retailers (Table 2). A qualitative 
research methodology with multiple cases was used to obtain in-depth information on the functions of 
POs. According to Yin (2003), case studies are used to provide in-depth information regarding a specific 
phenomenon in the field. The interviews were conducted from November 2016 through March 2017. The 
operationalisation of the VCA concept in the interviews is shown in Table 1. All  interviews were recorded 
and transcribed. The average length of the interviews was about 90 minutes.  
 
Figure 3. Research locations  
                                                 
3 The three modern retailers are Transmart Carrefour, Giant Supermarket, and Superindo 






5 Descriptive results 
5.1 Network structures  
The three POs in this study were founded in the 2000s at the initiative of the farmers themselves. As 
communities of farmers, the POs’ main functions are helping farmers to learn; building cooperation 
among farmers; and helping farmers develop their farms. According to the interviews, the POs in our 
study have transformed from being community POs, with no marketing activities, to being marketing POs. 
The transformation of POs is pushed by the farmers themselves and also comes from increasing demand 
of high-value markets (e.g., processors, export markets, and modern domestic retail). Importantly, the 
growth of high-value markets in Indonesia has changed the procurement process from weaker to stronger 
coordination between farmers and buyers through POs and contracting mechanisms (Reardon et al., 
2016; Sahara & Gyau, 2014). 
Specialised wholesalers and modern retailers are more likely to work with a group of farmers (thus POs) 
rather than with individual farmers, in their procurement of vegetables. They look for POs that can meet 
their quality, quantity, price, and delivery requirements. The three POs in our study are able to comply 
with the quality, quantity, price, and delivery requirements and therefore buyers have offered them 
contracts to supply vegetables. PO1 has been supplying vegetables to modern retailers since 2010, and  
PO2 and PO3 have been doing so since 2013.  
The POs that produce for these retail markets indicated to have strong horizontal collaboration among its 
members and strong vertical collaboration with the buyers, in order to meet the market demands. The 
network of PO1 includes 32 smallholder farmers supplying organic vegetables to the retailer. In the 
vertical relationship, PO1 has a direct contract with a modern retailer and three specialised wholesalers. 
Figure 2 shows that, in chain 2, the specialised wholesaler has an important role as intermediary actor 
connecting farmers and modern retailers. PO1 delivers the fresh vegetables to the specialised 
wholesalers, then the specialised wholesaler sorts, packages, labels, and delivers vegetables to the 
modern retailers.  
PO2 connects 50 smallholder farmers supplying organic vegetables to two retailers via two specialised 
wholesalers. The 50 farmer-members are located in one village. PO3 connects 30 smallholder farmers 
who supply non-organic vegetables to retailers through a specialised wholesaler.  
Table 3 shows the number of horizontal actors (farmers) and vertical actors collaborating in the PO value 
chains. Only PO1 deals directly with the retailer; the others work through specialised wholesalers.  
Table 3. 
The number of horizontal and vertical actors collaborating in the PO chain. 
PO Horizontal actors (farmers) collaborating Vertical actors collaborating 
PO1 32 1 modern retailer, 
3 specialised wholesalers 
PO2 50 2 specialised wholesalers 
PO3 30 1 specialised wholesaler 
Actors 
(number interviewed) 
Interviewee’s role Location 
Smallholder farmers (7) Members of the PO   Getasan-Semarang, Pakis-
Magelang, and Selo-Boyolali  
Producer organisations (3) Leader and secretary of the PO  Getasan-Semarang, Pakis-
Magelang, and Selo-Boyolali 
Specialised wholesalers (4)  Owner  Cangkringan-Sleman, Depok-
Sleman, Teras-Boyolali, and 
Ngablak-Magelang   
Modern retailers (2) Purchasing staff   Yogyakarta and Surakarta 
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5.2 Added value  
PO1 increases the added value of vegetables by providing technical assistance and facilitating organic 
production, such as sorting, cleaning, packaging, labelling of brand and organic certification, and 
distributing vegetables to the modern retailer directly. The regional government, as part of its aid 
initiative, gave PO1 a vehicle for delivering vegetables. The vehicle’s operational costs are covered by 
PO1. For this, PO1 has defined regulations about how membership fees are us ed for such operations and 
also for investments such as tools for improving production and post-harvest handling. PO1 provides 
technical assistance regarding the production of organic vegetables and provides members with organic 
fertilizer and environmentally-friendly phyto-pesticides. The technical assistance is provided by the PO 
members themselves and by an agricultural extension agent. During PO meetings, the members share 
information about what technical assistance they may need for improving production and implementing 
new technology. PO1 also has an internal control system (ICS) to monitor organic production and quality. 
The ICS team ensures that the vegetables are produced in accordance with organic farming guidelines, 
and it provides training in producing organic fertilizer and phyto-pesticides. Establishing an ICS in the PO 
is one of the requirements for achieving organic certification.  
To increase the added value of vegetables, PO2 provides technical assistance for its members in 
cultivating organic farming and it monitors production. The technical assistance comes from PO member-
farmers who share knowledge and experience, and also from the agricultural extension service. PO2 has 
built an ICS team to monitor and ensure that the vegetables are produced in accordance with organic 
farming guidelines. The PO also provides training to its members in producing organic fertilizer and 
phyto-pesticides. Post-harvest, PO2 sorts and cleans the members’ vegetables which are then 
transported to a specialised wholesaler who provides packaging with the brand and organic labelling and 
transports the products to the retailers. According to the agreement between the PO and the specialised 
wholesaler, half the cost of organic (re-)certification is covered by the wholesaler. 
 PO3 increases the added value of vegetables post-harvest only by sorting according to appearance and 
cleaning of the vegetables. There are no value-added activities in the PO related to improving quality or 
post-harvest handling. Specialised wholesalers pick up the vegetables at the PO and perform the rest of 
post-harvest handling activities required up to distribution to the retailers. Table 4 shows the differences 
in value-added activities across the three POs. PO1 performs more added value activit ies than the other 
POs. 
Table 4. 
Value-added activities in three PO cases. 
PO Production process Post-harvest handling Distribution 
 
PO1 Technical assistance for 
organic farming 
Sorting quality, cleaning, packaging, and 
labelling with 
brand and organic logos 
Delivery to buyers 
PO2 Technical assistance for 
organic farming  
Sorting quality and cleaning  Delivery to buyers 
PO3 - Sorting quality and cleaning  - 
5.3 Governance  
5.3.1 Vertical arrangements  
Regarding the vertical arrangements between POs and buyers, PO1 has written contracts with modern 
retailers directly and verbal agreements with the specialised wholesalers. The contracts include price 
agreements between the PO and the buyers. On average, the agreed price is slightly higher than the 
market price and tends to remain constant. The buyers set a base price based on the market price. If the 
market price rises, the PO can renegotiate the price agreement with the buyers. Quantity agreements in 
the contract are specified based on supply agreements. The retailer sets a fixed quantity of a specific 
vegetable to be ordered in one year during the contract. Every three days, the retailer orders vegetables 
from the PO in a certain volume, while specialised wholesalers order every weekday in a certain volume . 
Quality agreements in the contract with a modern retailer are determined by the prevailing quality 
standards. The standard establishes the appearance, size, packaging, branding, and organic certification 
as quality assurance of the products. Quality agreements in the contract with specialised wholesalers are 
specified for appearance, size, and organic certification. The place of delivery is the buyer’s location.  
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PO2 has verbal agreements with specialised wholesalers. The agreements include price arrangem ents. 
Specialised wholesalers set the base price based on the retail price. Quantity arrangements are based on 
supply agreements. In the purchasing order, the specialised wholesalers determine the volume of the 
order, including the kinds of vegetables. Quality specifications in the arrangements are based on 
appearance, size, and providing organic certification for quality assurance. The PO delivers the vegetables 
to the buyer’s location. The cost of transportation is partly covered by the buyers.  
PO3 has a verbal agreement with a specialised wholesaler. The agreement includes an arrangement on 
the price. The specialised wholesaler sets the base price of the contract based on the price established by 
the retailers. The specialised wholesaler orders the vegetables from the PO every weekday in a specific 
volume. The quality specifications in the contract are related to appearance and size. According to the 
place of delivery agreement, the specialised wholesaler picks up the vegetables from the PO’s location. 
Table 5 outlines the contract arrangements of the three POs.  
It demonstrates that the contract arrangements in PO1 are more compatible with modern retail than the 
others because PO1 has a direct contract with the modern retailer.  
Table 5. 
Contract arrangements between POs and buyers. 
5.3.2 Horizontal arrangements 
 The horizontal arrangements refer to the relationships among the farmers in the PO. PO1 holds regular 
meetings, at least once a month. In the meeting, the board of the PO and members share information, 
such as market and financial information. In addition, the PO organizes knowledge transfer among 
members and/or by agricultural extension officers. In the meeting, the decisions are made on strategies 
and operations for production, such as planting and harvesting schedules, distribution, determining what 
vegetables should be planted, and payment mechanisms. A part of revenues is retained by the PO to 
cover operational costs, re-certifying organics, and investing in new tools. PO1 provides member services 
such as a marketplace, technical assistance for improving quantity and quality of  organic products, and 
inputs.  
PO2 organises meetings at least once a month. In the meeting, information is shared with the members, 
including market conditions and the PO’s general financial status. PO2 also organizes knowledge transfer 
internally and/or with the agricultural extension service. PO2 makes decisions jointly with members 
concerning the procurement of vegetables, such as arranging the schedule for planting, harvesting, and 
distributing, and determining what kinds of vegetables should be planted, and the payment mechanism. 
As an organisation driven by member-farmers, this PO provides member services, such as market access 
and technical assistance to improve the quantity and quality of organic products.  
PO3 organises regular meetings at least once a month. In the meeting, the PO and members share market 
and financial information and occasionally organize knowledge transfer within the PO internally and/or 
with the agricultural extension service. All decisions are discussed internally with the memb ers on 
matters relating to the supply of vegetables to the modern retail market, including harvesting and 
distribution schedules, the kinds of vegetables to be planted, and payment mechanisms. PO3 offers 
services, such as providing a marketplace for its members, knowledge sharing, and training related to 
crop production. 
PO Type of 
agreement 
Price Quantity Quality Delivery 
location 
PO1 Written and 
verbal contract 







PO2 Verbal contract Price agreement Fixed Appearance, size, 
and organic 
certification  
Buyer’s location   
(half the cost of 
transportation paid 
by buyer) 
PO3 Verbal contract  Price agreement Fixed  Appearance and 
size 
PO’s location 
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It is clear that all three POs hold regular meetings and involve their members in making decisions. The 
difference is in member services; PO1 provides more services consisting of marketplac e, technical 
assistance for improving quantity and quality of organic products, and technical input for farming.  
6 Discussion  
The aim of the study was to explore how POs in Indonesia have upgraded their value chains, hence help 
the smallholder farmers to link with modern retail markets. In line with the three principal elements of 
value chain analysis – network structure, added value, and governance - the POs have upgraded their 
value chains to resolve smallholders’ constraints and link farmers to the mode rn retail market. For 
upgrading the network structure, the POs entered vertical networks with specialised wholesalers, and 
PO1 has a direct relationship with modern retail. The capabilities of POs to improve their networks, 
particularly with vertical actors such as specialised wholesalers and directly with modern retailers, can 
enhance their ability of accessing new market channels. These findings are in line with other studies that 
have shown that building networks may lead to increased market share and va lue-added market channels 
(Fitter & Kaplinksy, 2001; Gereffi, 1999).  
With regard to upgrading added value, POs increase the value of the vegetables supplied by smallholders 
by providing technical assistance on organic farming in PO1 and PO2, post -harvest handling activities, 
such as sorting and cleaning in all three POs, packaging and labelling in PO1, and distribution of the 
vegetables in PO1 and PO2. Such added value complies with the quality requirements of the buyers. 
Upgrading the value-added activities in the PO can resolve smallholder constraints related to low quality 
compliance. The role of POs in increasing the added value of smallholders’ production has been 
presented in previous studies (Moustier et al., 2010; Roy & Thorat, 2008). 
Upgrading the governance of value chains includes both vertical and horizontal governance 
arrangements. The governance structure in the vertical relationship between POs and buyers is the 
contract. The three POs had a variety of contract arrangements with buyers (Table 5). By switching the 
form of governance from spot market to the contract, transaction costs between the farmers or POs and 
the buyers are reduced (Ménard, 2005; Williamson, 1999). The contract may lead to a reduction of 
transaction costs by reducing the cost of monitoring, coordination, and information at the buyer level 
(Bijman, 2008; Kirsten & Sartorius, 2002). The quality arrangement in the contract can reduce buyers’ 
monitoring cost because the vegetables supplied already went through quality inspections. Coordination 
to meet contract arrangements is conducted by POs rather than by individual farmers. Hence, the 
coordination cost in the transaction can be minimised. Information costs can also be reduced by contracts 
because the contract specifies the characteristics required—price, quantity, quality, and delivery. Only 
farmers who can meet these requirements will become suppliers. Therefore, the cost of monitoring 
suppliers can be minimised. A contract reduces uncertainty for farmers because it provides a guarantee 
of sales. Through a contract, the buyer absorbs the vegetable production of the farmers. Contracting also 
lowers the risk of high asset specificity because the farmers’ investments in the production of high -value 
vegetables is rewarded at ex ante agreed prices.  
The governance structure in the horizontal arrangement among farmers in a PO reflects  the internal 
governance of the PO in arranging meetings, decision making, and providing member services (Bijman et 
al., 2007; Bijman et al., 2014). The empirical results show that the three POs hold regular meetings and 
that decision making is shared among the members. As an organisation formed by smallholder farmers, 
the POs provide a variety of member services, including a marketplace, technical assistance for improving 
quantity of production and quality of organic products, and inputs. Upgrading the internal governance of 
POs by organising meetings, shared decision-making, and providing member services may reduce 
asymmetric information and opportunistic behaviour (Bijman & Wollni, 2008). In addition, upgrading the 
governance structure through contracts and enhancing the internal governance of the PO may strengthen 
the bargaining position of the farmers in the value chains. This is clearly observed in the capabilities of 
these three POs to negotiate contract arrangements with buyers.  
7 Conclusions and implications  
Many studies have explored the upgrading of value chains of firms in the export market, and several 
studies have explored value chain upgrading in domestic market. However, the role of POs in upgrading 
of agrifood value chains in domestic markets in developing countries has rarely been analysed. This study 
explores how POs in Indonesia upgraded their value chains to  link smallholders to modern domestic 
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retail markets. We used Value Chain Analysis (VCA) to explore upgrading in three elements — network 
structure, added value, and governance.  
The empirical results show that POs upgraded their value chains, thereby helping smallholders link with 
modern retail markets. In the upgrading of network structure, the POs built a network with vertical 
actors, such as specialised wholesalers and modern retailers. In addition, the POs strengthened their 
network horizontally with the farmer members coordinating in the sales of vegetables. The capabilities o f 
POs to build their networks, particularly with vertical actors, can help smallholders’ access modern retail. 
In the added-value upgrading, the PO helps farmers increase the value of their vegetables by providing 
technical assistance for organic farming, post-harvest handling, and distribution to the buyers. The value-
added activities in the POs consist of their efforts to help the smallholders comply with the quality 
standards and specifications established in the contract. In upgrading the governance of the value chain, 
the POs bolster the vertical arrangements through contracts and the horizontal arrangements through 
their internal governance. Upgrading governance both vertically and horizontally can reduce transaction 
costs and strengthen the bargaining position of POs in value chains. The combination of the three items 
of value chain upgrading mitigates smallholders’ constraints and enables linking them to modern 
retailers. 
Based on these results, we can point to some managerial implications for POs to improve their 
capabilities. First, POs should upgrade their value chains by improving their networks, particularly with 
vertical actors, to obtain market access. Second, POs can improve added value by increasing the 
smallholders’ capabilities to comply with quality standards and specifications of modern retailers. Third, 
governance can be improved by negotiating contracts with buyers in the vertical chain, which may 
strengthen members’ bargaining position. In the horizontal dimension, improving the internal  governance 
enhances the collaboration within the PO to meet market expectations. The empirical evidence shows 
that POs in Indonesia can help smallholders link with modern retail. It provides the lesson that POs have 
an important role in increasing smallholder participation in modern retail markets. Therefore, policy 
makers should support POs in the process of upgrading their value chains. For example, they should 
support POs to collaborate in value chains, provide assistance to POs to increase the added va lue of 
vegetables, and finally, support POs in the mechanisms of contract negotiations.  
There are several limitations associated with our research. The first is that the study examines only three 
POs. Future research could include more and different types of POs, to gain a more complete assessment. 
Second, upgrading value chains in this study focused on three elements. For future studies, the research 
could look into other elements involved in upgrading value chains, such as reinforcing partnerships with 
non-chain actors like governments and NGOs. Third, upgrading in this study focused on the economic 
perspective, i.e. linking farmers to modern retail markets. Future studies on value chain upgrading could 
also include environmental and social objectives. Integrating these different perspectives in research on 
POs in value chains could contribute to more sustainable upgrading of developing country value chains. 
Fourth, this research used qualitative methods to collect data for describing the role of POs in li nking 
smallholder farmers with the retail market. Future studies could include a quantitative approach to gain a 
more comprehensive understanding of the impact of PO coordination in improving smallholders’ access 
to modern retail markets. 
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